As part of our regular consultations on export control cooperation, the European Commission hosted a meeting with counterparts from Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States on 10 July 2024, to discuss ongoing efforts to align and enhance our export restriction measures imposed in response to Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine.

The swift, unprecedented and massive export restrictions we have collectively imposed since February 2022 have been calculated and continuously adjusted over time to maximise their effect on Russia’s military industrial base. As Russia intensifies illicit procurement attempts, it must not be given access to those items needed to manufacture its weapons and supply its military —either directly from the coalition of partner nations, or indirectly through transshipment networks often involving non-sanctioning third countries. Companies that seek to profit from selling coalition commodities, software and technology into Russia do so at our collective expense.

Our services will continue enhancing and expanding, as appropriate, regulatory requirements in light of information from the battlefield, in order to maintain the effectiveness of our measures. Our national competent authorities will continue to hold those who violate our laws accountable.

We are grateful for the efforts of industry to devote appropriate resources to know their customers and counter the risks of illegal transshipment. We have collectively developed specific tools to support industry compliance, such as the Common High Priority List (CHPL) of battlefield items. We are also actively identifying companies associated with Russia’s military-industrial complex and involved in the circumvention of our measures. We will continue issuing public guidance to improve the reach and effect of our export restrictions imposed in response to Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine.

We encourage industry to take advantage of the very significant information and guidance issued to improve its compliance screening.  We call on responsible traders to improve export compliance systems and exercise enhanced due diligence. This includes making efficient use of sources such as public business registries, commercially available trade databases, and information collected by non-profit organizations to identify companies that present a high risk of future diversion. These would notably include companies with a prior record of diverting controlled items from our substantially aligned export control systems to Russia.

The ability of industry to identify high-risk transactions can make a difference. Our collective actions will be both complementary and coordinated so that we continue to effectively address this ongoing threat to international security.